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Abstract
Security modifications to legacy network protocols are ex-
pensive and disruptive. This paper outlines an approach,
based on external security monitors, for securing legacy
protocols by deploying additional hosts that locally mon-
itor the inputs and outputs of each host executing the pro-
tocol, check the behavior of the host against a safety spec-
ification, and communicate using an overlay to alert other
hosts about invalid behavior and to initiate remedial ac-
tions. Trusted computing hardware provides the basis for
trust in external security monitors. This paper applies this
approach to secure the Border Gateway Protocol, yield-
ing an external security monitor called N-BGP. N-BGP
can accurately monitor a BGP router using commodity
trusted computing hardware. Deploying N-BGP at a ran-
dom 10% of BGP routers is sufficient to guarantee the se-
curity of 80% of Internet routes where both endpoints are
monitored by N-BGP. Overall, external security monitors
secure the routing infrastructure using trusted computing
hardware and construct a security plane for BGP without
having to modify the large base of installed routers and
servers.
1 Introduction
Security improvements to legacy network protocols often
require modifications to the protocol implementation and
changes to or replacements for all deployed hosts execut-
ing the protocol. Such changes are expensive and can be
disruptive, especially if the protocol is deployed on in-
frastructure and the hosts are routers or servers. Signifi-
cant benefits might not follow until most of the hosts have
been upgraded. Security improvements that avoid mod-
ifications to a protocol implementation are cheaper, less
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Figure 1: An external security monitor monitoring the
traffic for a legacy host on two network links.
disruptive, and thus more likely to get deployed.
We propose external security monitors (ESMs) as a
means of identifying malicious, misconfigured, or com-
promised hosts, thereby providing a way to secure legacy
network protocols. An ESM is an additional trusted host
or process dedicated to ensuring that one host executing a
protocol complies with a safety specification. Each ESM
obtains input and output messages from a legacy host—
either by acting as a proxy or by sniffing the network—
and issues certificates asserting that each message com-
plies or does not comply with the safety specification.
ESMs must be trusted, and in our implementation
this trust is based on guarantees provided by secure co-
processor hardware.1 Figure 1 illustrates an ESM attached
to a host executing an unmodified legacy protocol.
We demonstrate the ESM approach to securing legacy
network protocols by applying it to the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP), a topic that has received much attention
in recent years [6,9,13,20,22,25]. We chose BGP because
it provides performance and scale challenges, because it
admits a safety specification, and because no past attempt
to secure it has been widely deployed. Our ESM imple-
mentation, N-BGP, runs on the Nexus, a new native op-
erating system we have developed for trusted computing,
though other systems that provide attestation [4, 16–19]
could have been used instead.
The obvious alternative to ESMs would be to execute
legacy protocols on trusted computing platforms. How-
1Today’s industry standard secure co-processors, like the Trusted
Computing Group TPM [23], provide means for securely identifying
software through remote attestation [5]. Such attestation creates a ba-
sis for trust, because recipients of a message now have assurance that
the source of the message is executing the software it is supposed to.
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ever, the ESM approach is less disruptive to deploy, be-
cause it does not require changes to the legacy proto-
col implementation or necessitate reconfiguration of de-
ployed legacy hosts. ESMs are cheaper because an ESM
does not need to run on server-class hardware, implement
the target protocol or carry out its side effects.
ESMs can be applied to any protocol that admits a
safety specification, a set of rules about what messages
a host may send based on its configuration and messages
previously sent and received. The output of an ESM is
a sequence of certificates indicating either the confor-
mance or non-conformance of the host against a set of lo-
cally checked safety criteria. Composition of judiciously
crafted local safety criteria can enable some global prop-
erties, such as loop freedom in a routing protocol, to be
maintained. Other global properties require coordination
among ESMs. For example, the output stream of each
ESM can be disseminated to other ESMs to enable re-
medial actions to be taken in response to invalid (non-
conformant) behavior.
In the ESM approach, an overlay comprising the ESMs
performs this dissemination. With N-BGP, this overlay
constitutes a security plane that is used to announce UP-
DATE messages that an ESM has deemed to be invalid.
ESMs forward such alerts on the security plane to legacy
hosts and network administrators so that appropriate de-
fensive action (e.g. blocking the use and forwarding of in-
valid routes) can be taken. Having an overlay allows ESM
hosts to detect some invalid behavior by BGP speakers
that are not monitored by a local ESM. ESMs can provide
some benefits with as few as two ESMs deployed.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We introduce the concept of external security mon-
itors, a novel approach for adding security features
to legacy network services without having to replace
existing hardware and software.
• We present N-BGP, a prototype ESM that protects
BGP. We provide a safety specification for BGP.
• We quantify the benefits realized from a partial de-
ployment of N-BGP, compare it to S-BGP [9] and
soBGP [13], and show that deployment rates as low
as 10% can secure nearly 80% of all Internet routes
where both endpoints deploy an ESM.
Section 2 describes BGP and some of the prior work
on securing it. Section 3 describes in more detail the de-
sign space for ESMs. Section 4 describes our prototype,
N-BGP, and Section 5 presents our experimental evalua-
tion of N-BGP.
2 Background
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [14] is the routing
protocol deployed among autonomous systems (ASes) in
the Internet. An autonomous system is a subset of the IP
address space presumed to be under uniform administra-
tive control. A BGP speaker is any router that implements
BGP. BGP speakers are usually routers at the edges of au-
tonomous systems. A large autonomous system may have
many BGP speakers that coordinate to present a consistent
view. BGP speakers maintain TCP connections to peers,
BGP speakers at the other ASes with which the local AS
has a peering relationship. A BGP speaker is connected to
its peers by statically configured, one-hop links.
Each AS owns one or more IP prefixes (contiguous sets
of IP addresses that share a set of leading bits) used by lo-
cal hosts. Each BGP speaker maintains a table of routes
to every valid IP prefix on the Internet. BGP speakers
disseminate and discover this information by announcing
their own IP prefixes and by receiving similar announce-
ments from BGP speakers in peer ASes. A BGP speaker’s
configuration lists which prefix or prefixes it originates,
which other BGP speakers are its peers, and policies for
choosing a preferred route to each prefix.
The Internet has over 200,000 prefixes [15]. Any
change in the location or routing of an IP prefix must be
broadcast to all BGP speakers, leading to traffic that scales
quadratically with the number of BGP speakers. To alle-
viate this inefficiency, BGP speakers often aggregate ad-
jacent prefixes routed to or through a single peer. That is,
two or more routes for contiguous prefixes with the same
next hop can be combined. BGP speakers may also adver-
tise a subset of a received prefix if one received advertise-
ment partially supersedes another received advertisement.
Advertising a subset of a prefix is called de-aggregation.
BGP involves four types of messages: OPEN,
KEEPALIVE, NOTIFY, and UPDATE. Most BGP speak-
ers use per-packet MD5 hashes [7] to achieve both authen-
tication and integrity. TCP-MD5 protects against spoofing
and connection-termination attacks, which is sufficient
to protect OPEN, KEEPALIVE, and NOTIFY messages.
This paper, like most BGP security research, is concerned
with the content of UPDATE messages.
UPDATE messages allow BGP routers to announce and
propagate routes. Each UPDATE message describes how
to reach one or more destination prefixes. The AS PATH
field of an UPDATE message lists the ASes along which
the UPDATE message was forwarded, which indicates a
path (in reverse) that future data traffic can take to reach
the listed destination prefixes. An UPDATE message may
also contain one or more prefixes to withdraw. A BGP
speaker withdraws a route when it becomes unavailable
or otherwise ceases to be the preferred route.
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2.1 BGP Security
Most attacks against BGP share a single goal: gaining
control over traffic to one or more prefixes from one or
more routers. Attackers might have any of several motives
for doing so: eavesdropping, spoofing, denial of service,
or simply increasing the volume of traffic carried over a
particular network. Attacks to capture traffic are realized
by false or modified UPDATE messages. An attacker’s
router can claim to be the origin for the target prefix, or
it can claim to have a short (i.e., preferred) path to the tar-
get prefix. Either claim can be a purely fabricated message
or a modified version of a legitimate message.
Accidental misconfigurations resemble attacks. For ex-
ample, an administrator can configure a BGP router to
originate the wrong prefix. Alternatively, a valid BGP
speaker can be compromised, either by a remote attacker
or by an insider.
Attackers can also block, modify, or inject packets into
an established connection between two valid BGP speak-
ers. Such attacks can be trivially addressed with TCP-
MD5 [7]; we do not discuss them further in this paper.
Any system for securing BGP must provide strong
guarantees, must be incrementally deployable, must be
simple to configure, must have virtually no impact on
BGP convergence time, and should not require the cre-
ation of new organizational entities [2]. A BGP security
system should detect malicious, compromised, and mis-
configured BGP speakers. Any BGP security system that
uses online keys at each BGP speaker should remain se-
cure even if some of the keys are compromised.
2.2 Related Work
Prior efforts to secure BGP can be grouped into four cat-
egories: certificate chains, link-state hybrids, routing reg-
istries, and comparison of multiple paths or perspectives.
Certificate Chains: One approach for verifying the in-
tegrity of a route is to issue hop-by-hop certificates for
each component of the route; a certificate chain vouches
for the full route. One such approach is S-BGP [9]. S-
BGP establishes two certificate hierarchies: one to iden-
tify ASes and BGP speakers and a second to identify IP-
prefix allocation. Keys identified by these certificates are
used to sign each UPDATE with address attestations to
verify the originating AS’s right to host that prefix and
route attestations to confirm the forwarding path the UP-
DATE took from the originating AS.
Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP) [25] refines S-BGP’s ap-
proach by having the peers of an AS attest to that AS’s
right to originate a prefix, rather than depending on a cen-
tralized infrastructure to map IP ranges to ASes.
BIND [20] is a code attestation scheme that guarantees
any UPDATEs a BGP speaker sends are valid if that BGP
speaker has received valid input and is running valid code.
BIND, like N-BGP, uses TPM hardware to enforce code
integrity. However, BIND requires existing BGP routers
to be replaced with trusted hardware, and BIND can-
not provide guarantees for paths with even a single non-
participating router.
Certificate chains depend on transitive trust. Any mali-
cious router on an UPDATE-forwarding path can break
the chain of trust by stripping all security information
from the UPDATE message. In the case of BIND, any
router on the UPDATE-forwarding path that is not running
BGP atop BIND, even if it is not malicious, will break the
chain of trust. Thus, these protocols cannot guarantee path
integrity if any router on the path might be malicious.
Link-state Hybrids: Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [13]
uses a link-state approach to validate routes. Each soBGP
speaker distributes a signed peer list to other soBGP
speakers. Each soBGP speaker maintains an AS-level map
of the Internet based on peer lists it receives. BGP speak-
ers use this map to confirm the feasibility of routes they
receive, though they cannot verify the path an UPDATE
message took. To exchange information with soBGP
speakers that are not peers (i.e., for incremental deploy-
ment), soBGP uses statically configured tunnels. Opera-
tors might resist soBGP because it requires public disclo-
sure of peering and policy information.
SoBGP speakers can confirm the feasibility of a path
even if that path has non-soBGP speakers on it. The
soBGP speakers immediately before and after a non-
soBGP speaker can verify that they each have a peering
relationship with the non-soBGP speaker, which would
make an UPDATE path through the non-soBGP speaker
feasible. For example, if ASes A and C have soBGP
speakers and AS B does not, and B peers with both A
and C , then when the soBGP speaker at C receives an
UPDATE with the AS PATH {A, B}, it can confirm that
the path is feasible, even though the speaker at B does not
run soBGP. More generally, soBGP can confirm the feasi-
bility of a path as long as no two non-soBGP speakers are
adjacent on the path.
SoBGP speakers can confirm only the feasibility of the
AS PATH in a received UPDATE, not the actual path the
UPDATE has been forwarded. Thus, an attacker may be
able to advertise paths that exist but have not been le-
gitimately advertised for policy reasons. SoBGP also re-
quires online keys so that an soBGP speaker can announce
changes in connectivity. Thus, compromising an soBGP
speaker leads to a compromise of its keys.
Routing Registries: Routing registries store peering
and policy information to help routers confirm the fea-
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sibility of the paths they receive. One routing registry is
Internet Routing Validation (IRV) [6], in which each AS
maintains the subset of the registry containing its peering
and policy information. IRV hosts can share this informa-
tion selectively and can export dynamic information, in-
cluding route announcements, current routing tables, and
advertised routes. One IRV host can query several oth-
ers along a path to ensure that a received UPDATE has
a legitimate origin and has not been corrupted in transit.
Like ESMs, IRV hosts are deployed on independent hosts
rather than on BGP speakers. However, IRV hosts affirm
policy and state information rather than correctness, and
they do not leverage trusted hardware to guard against
compromises or misconfiguration. IRV hosts must also be
manually synchronized to the router’s policy and peering
arrangements.
Routing registries have security properties similar to
soBGP. A BGP speaker can confirm the feasibility of an
UPDATE path (but not the path traveled by the UPDATE)
as long as no two adjacent ASes on the path are absent
from the registry.
Multiple Paths and Perspectives: Listen and Whis-
per [22] employs a passive approach to securing BGP.
BGP speakers implementing Whisper add a new field to
UPDATE messages. The BGP speaker originating a route
places a random value in the field. Each BGP speaker for-
warding an UPDATE replaces the value of the field with
a hash of the previous value. A BGP speaker that receives
two paths to the same prefix can check for path trunca-
tion attacks by comparing the lengths of both AS PATHs
and repeatedly hashing the value included with the shorter
path. BGP speakers implementing Listen monitor data-
plane traffic and signal an alarm if an unusually large
amount of traffic to any given prefix range is rejected.
Whisper has security properties similar to certificate
chains. If all paths to a destination contain BGP speakers
without Whisper installed, then Whisper cannot make any
guarantees about paths to that destination. Listen solves a
different problem: detecting whether or not a chosen path
is unusable for any reason (e.g., misconfiguration, an at-
tack, or a network outage). A single BGP speaker with
Listen installed can detect unusable paths. However, while
other solutions are proactive, Listen can only discover
unusable paths after the fact, after traffic has been mis-
routed and dropped. Listen can discover unusable paths
that proactive techniques miss, making it a complemen-
tary technique.
3 External Security Monitors
External security monitors ensure that the protocol imple-
mentation on legacy hosts exhibits valid behavior, compli-
ant with a safety specification. Installing an ESM to mon-
itor each host in a distributed system ensures that all hosts
in the system exhibit valid behavior. When some hosts are
not monitored, then ESMs monitoring other hosts may be
able to coordinate to derive guarantees about the behavior
of unmonitored hosts. For example, if all of a host’s peers
are monitored, then all of the host’s inputs and outputs will
be seen by at least one ESM, even though the host itself is
not monitored. The unmonitored hosts’ peers’ ESMs can
communicate to determine if the unmonitored host’s be-
havior is valid.
The attestations or warnings an ESM sends are only
useful if the recipient trusts the ESM. A trusted computing
platform helps establish this trust. Such a platform com-
prises secure hardware that provides the basis for trust and
a secure operating system capable of attestation. In our
implementation, a commodity secure co-processor called
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [23] provides the hard-
ware basis for trust, while the Nexus operating system,
a small, secure microkernel that facilitates isolation be-
tween components provides the attestation. Overall, our
system requirements are similar to that explored in pre-
vious work [5, 17]. The hardware carries an inherent key,
which can be vetted by a certificate authority at the time of
manufacture or established at a certificate authority at the
time of initial establishment of “coprocessor ownership,”
as defined in the TPM specification.
Attestation produces a certificate, based on the secure
coprocessor’s embedded key, that captures all the binary
hashes of the bootstrap loader, the operating system, the
external security monitor, and the input configuration for
the external security monitor. Such a certificate securely
identifies the binary version of all relevant software and
configuration data for an ESM installation. An attacker
who modifies the ESM, the ESM configuration, or the un-
derlying system environment for the ESM—for instance
by modifying the disk image of the corresponding bina-
ries on disk—cannot masquerade as a legitimate ESM, as
the binary modifications will be apparent in the certificate.
ESMs can protect against several different kinds of
attacks. They detect any network communication by
the monitored host that violates the safety specification,
whether it is the result of compromise by an outside at-
tacker, misconfiguration, or even insider attacks.
The trusted hardware platform and the attestation ser-
vices protect against compromises of the ESM code itself.
While it is possible for the ESM software to contain a flaw,
such as a buffer overflow, that an attacker can exploit, the
effect of such compromises can be contained through sys-
tem architecture. First, unlike traditional attestation that
only checks a program’s validity at load time, the Nexus
supports active attestation, which allows it to verify run-
time properties of an application. For example, the Nexus
can check the integrity of the ESM code, or of sections
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Figure 2: Three decisions regarding the deployment of ex-
ternal security monitors.
of ESM code, immediately before the code is executed,
thereby ensuring that a change to the binary to circum-
vent the safety checking code is apparent in the certifi-
cate. Even in a system without active attestation, a one-
time compromise cannot be amplified into a long-lived
vulnerability, because persistent changes (e.g. to the ESM
binary on disk) will be detected when the ESM is next
restarted. Second, the Nexus provides a highly componen-
tized system model where non-essential services reside in
isolated protection domains outside the kernel. This yields
a smaller trusted computing base for applications, as iso-
lation eliminates non-essential services from the global
trusted computing base. In the case of ESMs, this means
that a compromise in one part of the ESM can be isolated
from other parts. In particular, cryptographic functionality
can be isolated in a separate task or in the TPM hardware
itself, meaning that compromising an ESM does not yield
its keys. An attacker cannot make a compromised ESM
sign incorrect statements. Finally, ESMs are much sim-
pler than the network protocols and services they monitor.
ESMs do not have to implement a service’s side effects,
persistent state, or user interface, and do not need to place
as great an emphasis on performance or availability. This
increased simplicity makes ESMs less likely to be com-
promised in the first place.
3.1 Deployment
The placement of ESMs involves three considerations:
where the ESM is placed relative to the host it is mon-
itoring, how the ESM collects network messages to and
from the host, and what the ESM does when it detects in-
valid behavior. These decisions are illustrated in Figure 2
and described in detail below.
Location: An ESM may be a process on the existing
host, or it may run on an independent machine. Since
the host running the ESM requires support for trusted
computing, deploying ESMs on existing hosts is typically
not feasible. An ESM must receive all of the monitored
host’s inputs and outputs, but an ESM on a separate host
cannot always be assured that it is connected to all of a
host’s network links. A malicious administrator can stage
a communication-hiding attack by disconnecting the ESM
from one or more of the hosts’s links. Often, an ESM
can detect a communication-hiding attack by comparing
the traffic it sees with traffic that the ESMs attached to
the host’s peers see, unless those peers’ administrators are
colluding in the attack.
Collection: An ESM may observe its host either by
passively sniffing packets on all network links that the
host is connected to or by acting as a proxy between
the host and all other hosts. This choice is orthogonal
to the location of the ESM. Deployment as a proxy can
strengthen security by enabling the ESM to block invalid
messages. However, acting as a proxy can make the ESM
a performance and availability bottleneck, and it usually
requires modifications to the monitored host’s configura-
tion. A transparent proxy may be deployed without mod-
ifying the host’s configuration, but it remains a perfor-
mance and availability bottleneck.
Attestation: ESMs may check the behavior of a host
in one of two ways. The first is to attest to the correct-
ness of the data flowing between two peer hosts by cre-
ating a safe channel over which only valid messages may
be transmitted. We refer to this approach, taken by most
prior work, as in-band attestation. In-band attestation re-
quires adding new software to the communication path
between two hosts; thus, it is possible only with active
(proxy) collection. The second option, out-of-band attes-
tation, is to create an additional channel for exchanging
message-validity information. For example, ESMs could
create a security plane that acts as a distributed database
of untrustworthy hosts or messages.
An ESM that detects invalid behavior issues a certifi-
cate describing the behavior or naming the misbehaving
host. The recipient of the certificate can be an adminis-
trator, another ESM, or a remote host speaking the same
protocol. Local administrators might wish to be notified to
detect a compromise or a misconfiguration. Remote ad-
ministrators might be notified to ignore an invalid mes-
sage or to sever a peering relationship with the compro-
mised host. Other ESMs might use the information to vote
or otherwise construct an aggregate view of the invalid be-
havior. Remote hosts might receive the warnings to pre-
vent or undo the effects of the invalid messages.
A single ESM provides a useful benefit: it can warn
local or remote hosts and administrators if it observes
invalid behavior. If two peer hosts are both monitored,
then the link between them can be considered trustwor-
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thy: any invalid messages on the link will be detected by
the sender’s ESM. In routing protocols, including BGP, if
enough routers along a path are monitored, then the en-
tire path is considered trustworthy: invalid behavior any-
where on the path will be detected. Also, a routing pro-
tocol might find many paths to a given destination; if any
one path is trustworthy, then traffic to the destination can
be sent along the trustworthy path. Thus, partial deploy-
ments of ESMs provide benefits that can be measured in
terms of the fraction of links or paths considered trustwor-
thy.
4 Monitor Architecture
N-BGP is an external security monitor for BGP. We refer
to an ESM running N-BGP as an N-BGP node. Each N-
BGP node monitors a single BGP speaker by sniffing each
of that BGP speaker’s links. N-BGP nodes coordinate us-
ing a security plane to propagate warnings about invalid
UPDATE messages.
4.1 Safety Specification
External security monitors require a safety specification
describing a host’s valid output, possibly in terms of its
configuration, it past inputs, or information received from
other ESMs in the security plane. In N-BGP, we define
a safety specification for UPDATE messages in terms of
the prefixes a BGP speaker originates and the UPDATE
messages it has previously received.
Routes in a BGP speaker’s routing table are 〈P,φ〉
pairs, where P is the set of IP addresses reachable by
the route and φ is the set (or a superset) of ASes through
which the route was forwarded to reach the BGP speaker.
Each UPDATE message contains, among other fields, the
advertised prefix and the AS PATH. (For a description of
these fields, see Section 2.) We map the advertised prefix
to P and the AS PATH to φ. In practice, the advertised ad-
dresses must be one or more prefixes, and the AS PATH is
frequently an ordered sequence. Our simplifications make
our specification more permissive but do not compromise
security, yielding the least restrictive safety specification
for UPDATE propagation.
We define the set HA of IP sets that the AS A is autho-
rized to originate and the set FA of all routes that AS A is
allowed to forward. FA contains all routes received from
peers and not withdrawn, as well as routes for everything
in HA:
• P ∈ HA ⇒ 〈P,∅〉 ∈ FA
FA also includes all potential aggregate routes:
• 〈P1,φ1〉 ∈ FA ∧〈P2,φ2〉 ∈ FA
⇒ 〈P1 ∪ P2,φ1 ∪φ2〉 ∈ FA
That is, FA includes the aggregate of any pair of routes
in FA and HA. The aggregate of two routes is defined
as the union of their IP prefixes and the union of their
AS PATHs.
Prior work has characterized what properties a rout-
ing system, including any BGP deployment, must have
in order to be secure [2, 3, 11, 20]. Based in part on this
work, we define the following safety specification for
BGP updates. The UPDATE 〈P,φ〉 is a permissible non-
withdrawal update for AS A to send if either of the fol-
lowing conditions holds:
• P ⊆ HA ∧φ = {A}
• 〈P ′,φ′〉 ∈ FA ∧ P ⊆ P ′ ∧φ = φ′ ∪{A}
That is, a message is valid if it is an advertisement for a
prefix that AS A is authorized to originate or if it is a re-
advertisement of a previously received UPDATE message.
AS A must also include itself in the AS PATH. These con-
ditions allow aggregation by including aggregated paths
implicitly in FA. They allow de-aggregation by allowing
the advertised prefix P to be a subset of any prefix in HA
or FA.
In addition to this specification, a BGP speaker must re-
advertise each route withdrawal it receives within some
timeout δ. Withdrawals may be explicit, with prefixes
listed in the withdrawal section of an UPDATE message,
or implicit, with a previous advertisement replaced by a
new advertisement for the same prefix. Wa→b(P, t) is a
predicate that holds if BGP speaker a sends a withdrawal
for the prefix P to BGP speaker b at time t . The rule for
withdrawals is:
• Wa→b(P, t) ⇒ ∀x ∈ Peers(b)|x = a
∨ (Wb→x(P ′, t ′)∧ P ′ ⊇ P ∧ t < t ′ ≤ t + δ)
The N-BGP safety specification addresses only which
route advertisements are legal under the BGP standard,
and not which advertisements conform to a site’s routing
policy. In particular, N-BGP does not enforce any prefer-
ence among valid routes, and it does not prevent a router
from advertising secret peering arrangements. However,
N-BGP’s filtering and attestation mechanisms can enforce
stricter, more detailed specifications; we are currently in-
vestigating extending N-BGP to support common site-
specific policies.
4.2 N-BGP Implementation
N-BGP operates on a separate, dedicated host running
the native Nexus operating system [21] on TPM-enabled
hardware [23]. The small footprint of the Nexus OS, its
partitioning of OS components into separate hardware
protection domains, and its support for hardware attesta-
tion provide a suitable foundation for a secure network
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Figure 3: A three-speaker BGP network with two N-BGP
nodes.
service. The Nexus provides an unforgeable certificate,
rooted in a key embedded in the TPM secure coproces-
sor, that attests to the untampered execution of a partic-
ular N-BGP node. The Nexus attests to the integrity of
execution by signing a hash of N-BGP’s binary image on
disk. Since this hash covers only a the code necessary for
safety-checking BGP, it is unlikely to change frequently.
A small database of trustworthy hashes can be maintained
manually at each N-BGP node so that each node can con-
firm which other N-BGP nodes are running the correct
code.
Our N-BGP implementation monitors BGP messages
passively. Figure 3 shows how N-BGP fits into a sim-
ple BGP network. Our implementation captures packets
to and from a BGP speaker using the libpcap library, re-
constitutes the TCP stream, and checks all UPDATE mes-
sages using the safety specification in Section 4.1. While
it is possible for a sniffer to miss packets and therefore to
incur false positives or false negatives, in practice, BGP
feeds have low data rates except when establishing new
connections. N-BGP allocates a buffer to accommodate
the burst of traffic accompanying a new BGP connection.
We have monitored BGP connections for weeks without
any packet losses.
Each N-BGP node starts with incomplete knowledge
of its monitored router’s state, because it has not seen
prior announcements that the router received. Because
BGP route announcements are not regularly refreshed, a
purely passive N-BGP node’s state would not converge
to a complete view over time. Fortunately, either restart-
ing the router’s connections or retrieving its routing table
through an administrative interface is sufficient to boot-
strap the N-BGP node’s state.
4.3 The Security Plane
N-BGP nodes communicate with each other for three
reasons: to detect invalid behavior by unmonitored BGP
speakers, to notify each other of invalid messages, and to
coordinate with other monitors in an AS. An isolated N-
BGP node can only detect invalid behavior by the BGP
speaker it monitors, and it has no response to invalid be-
havior other than notifying a local administrator. When N-
BGP nodes communicate, they can detect and counteract
invalid behavior at remote BGP speakers, including some
unmonitored speakers. Thus, an N-BGP node can provide
more useful functionality and better incremental deploy-
ability if it is connected to other N-BGP nodes and to its
monitored BGP speaker.
N-BGP nodes use the security plane to propagate
queries and warnings. Queries allow N-BGP nodes to de-
tect invalid behavior by some unmonitored nodes, and
warnings allow N-BGP nodes to react automatically to in-
valid behavior at remote BGP speakers.
Whenever possible, communication in the N-BGP se-
curity plane occurs between peers. N-BGP nodes peer
when the BGP speakers they monitor are peered. In ad-
dition, best-effort peering relationships with remote N-
BGP nodes can be set up manually to bypass interme-
diate BGP speakers not running N-BGP. These tunnels
are similar to the multi-hop tunnels used by soBGP. The
security plane uses the same topology as the underly-
ing BGP network. By using statically configured peering
relationships—one-hop peers and multi-hop tunnels—N-
BGP nodes avoid a circular dependency on the correctness
of BGP.
When an N-BGP node is initialized, it sends to all of
its peers an announcement containing its IP address, the
AS of the BGP speaker it monitors, and a certificate. The
certificate, C A for N-BGP node A, contains the N-BGP
node’s public key and a hash of the N-BGP executable on
disk, signed by the Nexus, plus an attestation chain rooted
in the TPM. The certificate is sufficient to prove that the
N-BGP node is running an intact copy of N-BGP, under an
intact copy of the Nexus, attested to by a legitimate TPM.
Each of the node’s peers forwards the IP address and AS,
but not the certificate, in a flood to all other N-BGP nodes
in the network. Each of the node’s peers also replies with
its own certificate and a session key, K AB for peer N-BGP
node B responding to N-BGP node A. K AB allows N-
BGP node A to send messages to N-BGP node B with
guaranteed confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The
whole exchange is shown in Figure 4. The abbreviations
used in the figure are explained in Table 4.3. Each N-BGP
node keeps a table of remote N-BGP nodes’ IP addresses,
AS numbers, and certificates received in initialization an-
nouncements. N-BGP nodes also keep a table of the ses-
sion keys established with each of their peers.
Invalid-Route Warnings: N-BGP nodes use out-of-
band attestation, so they cannot directly block invalid UP-
DATE messages. Instead, an N-BGP node that detects an
invalid UPDATE message floods a signed warning about
the message to all other N-BGP nodes. The flood follows
the peering relationships described above. The flood im-
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Abbrev. Definition
A, B N-BGP nodes
CA Certificate for N-BGP node A
PA, Public key for N-BGP node A
KAB Secret key generated by N-BGP node B and
shared with N-BGP node A
RVQ Route-validity query
RVR Route-validity response
W Invalid-route warning
#A/RVQ RVQ sequence number at N-BGP node A
#A/W Warning sequence number at N-BGP node A
MAC Message authentication code
Table 1: Abbreviations used in the protocol diagrams.
KAB := New key
AC
CB
KBA := New key
 
 
 E PB(KBA)
 
 
 
E PA(K AB
)
A B
Figure 4: Messages sent when N-BGP node A joins the
network, for each peer N-BGP node B.
plements, in effect, a distributed database of route adver-
tisements deemed suspect by the N-BGP node that first
detected them.
N-BGP floods two kinds of messages. The first is an
invalid-route warning. Such a warning is generated when-
ever a local N-BGP node encounters a new route adver-
tisement from its monitored BGP speaker that does not
satisfy the BGP safety specification. N-BGP nodes pre-
vent further dissemination of the invalid route by flood-
ing an invalid-route warning. Each N-BGP node keeps
its own database of known invalid routes and can either
alert an operator or temporarily reconfigure the local BGP
speaker to ignore any advertisement with a suffix match-
ing a warning in the database. Since BGP messages are
normally delayed up to 30 seconds to dampen route flap-
ping [24], the security plane can almost always dissemi-
nate an invalid-route warning before the invalid route af-
fects BGP speakers beyond the first hop. We expected
invalid UPDATEs to be uncommon, making the number
of warnings small and maintenance traffic and storage re-
quirements low.
N-BGP floods a clear-route message when a route ad-
vertisement, previously considered to be invalid, becomes
valid. For instance, a path {A, B,C} advertised by AS A
in the absence of other information would be marked in-
valid but would be cleared when AS A receives from AS
B the path {B,C}.
Both invalid-route warnings and clear-route messages
are sent encrypted with K AB , if sent from N-BGP node
A to N-BGP node B. That is, the message sent is
EKAB(W,#A/W ,MAC). Invalid-route warnings and clear-
route messages include a sequence number, both to pre-
vent replay attacks and to ensure that messages are pro-
cessed in the correct order.
N-BGP nodes use three techniques to defend against
malicious BGP speakers sending enough invalid routes to
constitute a denial-of-service attack. First, the database of
invalid routes is stored on disk, allowing it to be large.
Second, invalid routes are retired locally if they exceed the
database size. Least recently used warnings are removed
first, where use refers to a warning’s last use in filtering an
actual route seen on the control plane, or its arrival, if it
has not been used yet. Finally, a BGP speaker that gener-
ates more than a threshold number of invalid routes for the
database has all of its routes removed from the database
and is placed in a separate database listing malicious BGP
speakers. Unlike the invalid-route database, manual inter-
vention is required for a BGP speaker to be cleared from
the malicious-node database. This design enables the vast
majority of short-lived invalid route advertisements to be
managed automatically, while it keeps a malicious BGP
speaker from overflowing the invalid-route database.
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Figure 5: Route-validity query: upon receiving an UP-
DATE message (solid arrows), “N-BGP 4” contacts “N-
BGP 2” to check that the unmonitored node “BGP 3” has
correctly forwarded the UPDATE.
Route-Validity Queries: An N-BGP node can detect
invalid behavior by an unmonitored BGP speaker if the
BGP speakers immediately before it and after it in an UP-
DATE forwarding path are both monitored. To do this,
N-BGP uses route-validity queries, akin to the queries
IRV [6] uses to verify successor information. An N-BGP
node that receives an UPDATE message from an unmon-
itored BGP speaker contacts the N-BGP node for the last
monitored BGP speaker listed in the UPDATE. Figure 5
shows the BGP speakers and N-BGP nodes involved.
The AS PATH lists the ASes visited but not specific
BGP speakers or N-BGP nodes. Thus, the N-BGP node
initiating the query uses its table of known N-BGP nodes
to determine which ASes in the AS PATH are monitored
and by which N-BGP nodes they are monitored.
An N-BGP node receiving a route-validity query re-
sponds confirming the AS PATH it forwarded and which
AS it forwarded it to. An N-BGP node need only contact
the N-BGP node for the last monitored BGP speaker, be-
cause that N-BGP node will have already verified the path
up to and including itself. Route-validity queries can be
batched and cached to reduce network load.
In some cases, the remote N-BGP node will not be a
peer and delivery of the message will depend on BGP
routing. Even so, the local N-BGP node can be assured
that any response it receives comes from a valid N-BGP
node, because the remote N-BGP process runs on a trusted
platform that can vouch for the N-BGP code’s integrity.
Thus, an attacker cannot forge responses to route-validity
queries. An attacker can block the query or the response,
but the N-BGP node initiating the query can detect the
lack of a response as a failure.
Figure 6 shows the details of the messages involved.
The two nodes first execute a key exchange, to establish
a secure communication channel and to confirm to the
sending N-BGP node A that N-BGP node B is running
valid code. If the nodes involved are peers or if A has
sent a route-validity query to B recently, then A and B
will already have a shared key K B A, in which case they
can skip the first three messages in the protocol. Route-
validity queries include a sequence number to prevent re-
play attacks—i.e., an attacker replaying a route-validity
CB
KBA := New key
 
 
 E
KAB(RVQ,#A/RVQ ,MAC)
 
 
 
E KAB(RV
R,# A/RVQ ,M
AC)
 
 
 E PB(KBA)
A B
Get key
Figure 6: Messages sent when N-BGP node A submits a
route-validity query to N-BGP node B.
response when a route is no longer valid.
One or more route-validity queries allow N-BGP nodes
to detect whether or not any BGP speaker in a path for-
warded an invalid UPDATE message, provided no two ad-
jacent ASes on the path are unmonitored. A path verified
in this manner is deemed trustworthy. A path containing
only monitored BGP speakers requires no route-validity
queries and is trivially trustworthy.
Intra-AS Coordination: BGP speakers within a large
AS exchange routing information using an internal rout-
ing protocol such as iBGP or OSPF. N-BGP must either
support all internal routing protocols as legitimate sources
of routes to forward, or it must provide its own protocol to
convey learned routes from one N-BGP node to another.
We have chosen the latter approach. We treat an AS with
many speakers as having one logical speaker: legal out-
puts from all BGP speakers in the AS are defined in terms
of all prior inputs to any BGP speaker in the AS. All N-
BGP nodes within an AS form a distributed database to
store F , the table of authorized routes to forward. Incom-
ing routes learned are added to F using insert messages,
withdrawn routes are removed with delete messages, and
outgoing route advertisements are checked using lookup
messages.
5 Evaluation
We have evaluated N-BGP in two ways. First, we ran sev-
eral experiments with a prototype implementation. Sec-
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Host OS CPU RAM
host1 Linux 2.6.14 Opteron 275 (2.2 GHz) 15 GB
host2 Linux 2.6.17 Athlon64 X2 5000+ 2 GB
host3 Linux 2.6.17 Opteron 275 (2.2 GHz) 12 GB
host4 MacOS X 10.4 Core Duo (2.0 GHz) 512 MB
host5 Nexus Pentium 4 (1.7 GHz) 512 MB
host6 Nexus Pentium 4 (1.7 GHz) 512 MB
Table 2: The hosts used in all tests.
host2
Zebra
host3
N−BGP
host4
Zebra
host1
Zebra
PLUTO
(Arizona)
PLUTO
(ipls.internet2)
Figure 7: The testbed used to check for false positives
based on UPDATE messages from two PLUTO feeds.
ond, we simulated random partial deployments on the In-
ternet AS graph to estimate the utility that can be derived
from different levels of deployment.
5.1 Prototype
We have tested our N-BGP prototype with a network of
GNU Zebra [8] hosts (BGP speakers) receiving real UP-
DATEs from PLUTO sensors [12]. We have two goals in
doing so: measuring the performance and costs of check-
ing BGP traffic using commodity hardware and verifying
that N-BGP does not generate spurious warnings for any
valid traffic it receives in spite of a wide variety of BGP
policies. The hosts we used are listed in Table 2.
To check for spurious warnings, we attached an
N-BGP node to a Zebra host that was attached
to two other Zebra hosts, receiving two different
PLUTO feeds: planetlab1.arizona-gigapop.net and
planetlab1.ipls.internet2.planet-lab.org. The testbed is
shown in Figure 7. The monitored Zebra host received
competing routes from two peers and advertised its
preferred route in each case to the peer that did not send
it. The N-BGP node confirmed that each preferred route
(including all aggregations) was valid. We ran this test for
four weeks without any false positives.
We ran short tests of one N-BGP node to quantify
the resources it will need and the amount of traffic it
can check. We measured the message-processing rate, the
memory needed for N-BGP state, the buffer size and delay
for checking BGP start-up traffic, the number of hops re-
quired for a warning to overtake an invalid UPDATE mes-
sage, and the network overhead to execute a route-validity
query.
Message-Processing Rate: An N-BGP node performs
different processing for messages sent and received by the
host1
Zebra
host2
BGP replay
host5
N−BGP
Figure 8: The testbed used to measure the performance of
checking UPDATE messages.
monitored BGP speaker. Messages received by the BGP
speaker add, remove, or replace entries in the list of routes
the BGP speaker is authorized to forward. Messages sent
by the BGP speaker must be checked against the safety
specification. The rate at which N-BGP can check mes-
sages received by the BGP speaker, averaged over 30 tri-
als, is 20,417/sec (between 19,723 and 20,632 95% of the
time). The rate at which N-BGP can check messages sent
by the BGP speaker, averaged over 30 trials, is 27,770/sec
(between 25,248 and 29,520 95% of the time). We deter-
mined both figures by measuring the time N-BGP took
to process a full routing table from route-views.oregon-
ix.net [15], which consists of 211,206 routes and 10.7 MB
of BGP traffic The topology for this experiment is shown
in Figure 8.
N-BGP State: N-BGP must store all UPDATE mes-
sages that its BGP speaker has received that have not been
withdrawn. We estimated the memory requirements for
an N-BGP node monitoring a BGP speaker with a single
peer by replaying the 10.7 MB RouteViews routing table.
The test topology used is the same as above, as shown
in Figure 8. The memory used was 35.6 MB: the size of
the routing table plus overhead associated with efficient
data structures. Monitoring a BGP speaker with several
peers would take more memory—in the worst case, pro-
portional to the number of peers, but normally much less
because of similarities in prefixes advertised by the peers.
Start-Up Costs: When a connection is initiated be-
tween two BGP speakers, each BGP speaker sends its en-
tire routing table to the other. This communication com-
prises hundreds of thousands of UPDATE messages in a
few seconds or a few minutes. When checking the Route
Views routing table, which takes 1.97 seconds to replay,
N-BGP uses an average of 10.2 MB of its packet-capture
buffer (over 30 trials). N-BGP takes about 10 seconds to
finish checking the contents of the buffer.
Invalid-UPDATE Radius: When an N-BGP node de-
tects an invalid UPDATE, it is by definition too late to
prevent the recipient from acting on it. However, N-BGP
nodes forward warnings faster than BGP speakers for-
ward UPDATE messages, so the BGP speakers affected
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Figure 9: The number of hops an invalid UPDATE travels
before N-BGP warnings overtake it. Note the y axis: over
99% of all invalid UPDATE messages are quashed within
a single hop.
by an invalid route will usually be limited to a single
hop. We simulated the race between UPDATE propaga-
tion and the flood of warnings using the actual Internet
AS topology, as represented by the CAIDA AS Relation-
ships Dataset [1]. We measured the time to detect an in-
valid message as 88µs and the time for an N-BGP node
to receive, check, and forward an invalid-route warning
as 44ms. BGP speakers delay UPDATEs up to 30 sec-
onds [24]. Zebra in particular sends UPDATEs in batches
at 30-second intervals. Thus, we modeled the UPDATE
delay as a random quantity ranging from 0 to 30 seconds.
In our simulations, over 99% of all invalid UPDATE mes-
sages were prevented by an invalid-route warning after a
single hop. Figure 9 shows in detail the number of hops
the worst 1% of invalid UPDATEs travel.
The number of BGP speakers affected by an invalid
UPDATE depends on the out-degree of the BGP speaker
sending it. 99% of the time, fewer than 50 nodes are af-
fected. Figure 10 shows the number of hosts affected. Be-
cause the warning arrives within a few milliseconds, only
very short-term harm is done at the hosts the invalid UP-
DATE does reach.
Route-Validity Queries: As described in Section 4.3,
N-BGP uses route-validity queries to verify the validity
of UPDATE messages received from unmonitored BGP
speakers. We used the test configuration shown in Fig-
ure 11 to measure the costs of sending these queries. The
average query latency was 357ms in the common case and
526ms when a key exchange was needed. The total query
and response size is 77 bytes plus the AS PATH size (2
bytes per hop) in the common case and about 2 KB when
a key exchange is needed.
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Figure 10: The number of hosts affected by an invalid UP-
DATE before N-BGP warnings overtake it.
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PLUTO
(Arizona) Zebra
host1host4
Zebra
host6
N−BGP
host5
N−BGP
Figure 11: The testbed used to measure the performance
of route-validity queries.
5.2 Deployability
One of the most important considerations for security
modifications to an existing protocol is the feasibility of
incremental deployment. Retrofitting a deployed system
involves effort and expense and cannot take place all at
once. Thus, new mechanisms must provide improved se-
curity even when only a few sites have been upgraded.
General metrics for security are elusive. However, we
can quantify the fraction of AS-level routes that can be
verified as trustworthy, as a function of how many BGP
speakers have been upgraded. We refer to an AS as se-
cured if the BGP speakers in it have a given security ap-
proach installed and enabled. In the case of N-BGP, a se-
cured AS has one monitor per BGP speaker. We refer to
the path between two hosts as securable if any trustworthy
path exists between the two hosts.
We quantify the percentage of routes that are securable
using N-BGP and compare it to three other recent efforts
to secure BGP: s-BGP [9], BIND [20], and soBGP [13]. S-
BGP and BIND require uninterrupted chains of trust; for
these protocols, a path is trustworthy only if it comprises
only secured ASes. Other protocols, including soBGP and
N-BGP, tolerate one or more unsecured ASes but not two
adjacent ones. Note that if the originating or the final AS
is not secured, a client cannot establish trust in the over-
all path, so our analysis considers only paths where both
endpoints are secured.
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Figure 13: The average difference between the shortest
trustworthy path and the overall shortest path, in hops.
We examine BGP security using the AS-level topology
from the CAIDA AS Relationships Dataset [1]. We enu-
merated all AS pairs and counted which pairs had at least
one trustworthy path between them, for different levels
of deployment. We varied the deployment rate from 5%
to 100%, in each case selecting a random set of ASes to
mark as N-BGP-enabled. We ran 30 trials for each de-
ployment rate. Figures 12 and 13 show average values for
these 30 trials, with error bars indicating the 25th and 75th
percentiles.
Figure 12 shows the percentage of endpoint pairs with
at least one trustworthy path between them as a function
of deployment rate. There are two lines measuring the per-
centage of securable paths: one for BIND and S-BGP and
one for soBGP and N-BGP. Figure 13 shows the average
added cost in hops, for each protocol, of choosing a trust-
worthy path instead of the shortest path. The added cost
for BIND and S-BGP is low at low levels of deployment
because so few paths, most of them between nodes at the
core of the Internet, can be secured.
Protocols that can tolerate one or more non-adjacent
unsecured AS provide much better incremental benefit
than those that define a trustworthy path as consisting of
only secured ASes. N-BGP and soBGP can both secure
90% of paths given deployment at a random 15% of ASes.
For all the protocols shown here, the average difference
between shortest paths and trustworthy paths is small—
generally one AS-level hop or less. Thus, N-BGP is com-
parable to soBGP, and better than S-BGP and BIND, at
securing routes with low levels of deployment.
6 Conclusions
The availability of trusted computing hardware affords an
opportunity to improve the security of network protocols.
For deployed systems where replacing or upgrading ex-
isting hosts is not feasible, we proposed the use of exter-
nal security monitors, which treat existing hosts as black
boxes and confirm, based on their inputs and outputs, that
they correctly implement the desired protocol. Although
this paper focuses on BGP, we believe that external secu-
rity monitors are applicable to a wide variety of protocols.
This paper instantiates our proposed approach as N-
BGP, an external security monitor running under the
Nexus operating system. N-BGP complements the data
and control planes by providing a security plane that im-
plements a network-wide database of invalid routes. Ex-
ternal security monitors are well suited to BGP, as they
provide a cheap, simple, and incrementally deployable ap-
proach to secure the Internet routing infrastructure using
trusted computing hardware.
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